Importantly, these varying levels of institutional trust have become strongly correlated with political identity. A 2022 report by the American National Election Studies (ANES) found that Republican trust in government dropped to just 13% following the 2020 election (when Joe Biden (D) won the presidential race) compared to 45% among Democrats. This was a complete reversal from the 2016 election, when Democrats’ trust was low and Republican trust was comparatively high (when Donald Trump (R) was elected). This oscillation indicates an unstable foundation of trust in institutions and conditional trust based on partisan control. Such volatility makes democratic institutions vulnerable to manipulation, delegitimization, and anti-system narratives, especially during electoral transitions or periods of political scandal.

Furthermore, institutional trust is highly stratified along racial, socioeconomic, and generational lines. Black and Latino Americans, for example, have historically exhibited lower trust in law enforcement and the justice system due to systemic discrimination, over-policing, and inequities in legal outcomes (Pew Research Center, 2022; Pew Research Center, 2024). At the same time, younger Americans (ages 18–29) report the lowest trust in government of any age group, according to Pew (2023), citing climate inaction, student debt, and lack of representation as key grievances.

Comparative Case Studies in Institutional Trust

Germany demonstrates considerably higher levels of institutional trust. The OECD 2023 report ranks trust in the German government at 61%, significantly above the U.S. average. Germany’s political institutions benefit from a strong federal system with checks and balances, professional civil service, and a Constitutional Court widely perceived as impartial. Transparent policymaking and consistent rule enforcement have helped preserve public confidence, even amid political disagreements. Importantly, Germany has actively addressed past authoritarian legacies through civic education, institutional reforms, and a commitment to democratic accountability. These efforts have strengthened the legitimacy of the system and reduced the appeal of anti-system extremism.

Tunisia, while not without challenges, offers another instructive case. In the years following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia launched a national transitional justice process - including the Truth and Dignity Commission (established 2013–14) - and pushed forward significant civic participation initiatives like public consultations in constitutional drafting and the decentralization of political power to local municipalities. These efforts aimed to rebuild institutional trust by addressing past abuses, engaging citizens directly in governance, and distributing authority beyond the central state. Trust in the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) has remained relatively high compared to other government bodies, being considered a credible arbiter of democratic competition. While overall trust in Tunisian institutions remains mixed - hovering around 40–45% depending on the institution and survey year - this is still notable in the regional context, where trust in state institutions is typically much lower. The presence of relatively trusted electoral and judicial institutions has helped provide a democratic outlet for dissent, mitigating the risk of radicalization.

In contrast, Egypt and Turkey exhibit low levels of institutional trust, which correlates with the persistence of authoritarianism and heightened political extremism. In Egypt, the government under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has systematically repressed civil society, restricted media freedom, and undermined judicial independence. According to Arab Barometer (2022) data, trust in Egypt’s parliament is below 20%, and confidence in the judiciary is also low, undermined by perceptions of politicization and lack of accountability. Similarly, in Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, trust in government and judiciary institutions has plummeted due to widespread purges, media crackdowns, and the centralization of power. The World Values Survey reports that Turkish citizens' trust in parliament and political parties has declined sharply in recent years, with growing segments of the population viewing the political system as unresponsive or corrupt.

The experiences of Germany and Tunisia offer valuable lessons for the United States on how to rebuild and sustain institutional trust. Both cases demonstrate that trust can be cultivated through transparency, fairness, and efforts to include citizens in democratic decision-making. Germany’s investment in civic education, independent judiciary, and professional public administration (referring to merit-based, well-resourced, and politically neutral state institutions) serves as a model for restoring credibility. While the U.S. also has a large network of state and federal agencies, trust in these institutions has declined due to factors such as politicization, inconsistent service delivery, and perceptions of bureaucratic inefficiency. Tunisia, despite economic and political instability, shows that even fragile democracies can strengthen trust when institutions function with relative independence and openness. The U.S. could benefit from reinforcing institutional neutrality - particularly in law enforcement and judicial appointments - alongside empowering watchdog bodies and ethics enforcement mechanisms to expose and penalize misconduct, ensuring that powerful actors cannot operate above the law or manipulate democratic institutions unchecked.

Conversely, Egypt and Turkey serve as cautionary tales. In both cases, institutional decay and repression of dissent have created vacuums filled by extremism, conspiracy theories, and political violence. For the United States, continued erosion of governmental trust - especially when fueled by disinformation and political attacks on oversight institutions - risks similar destabilizing effects. Avoiding this path requires defending institutional autonomy, depoliticizing electoral and judicial bodies, and fostering public engagement through meaningful civic education and transparency.

Inclusion of Marginalized Groups

Democratic systems are strengthened when they are inclusive - particularly of groups historically excluded from political, economic, or social life. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), inclusive political processes are essential to democratic resilience because they ensure marginalized populations have a voice in public decision-making. These groups can include ethnic and religious minorities, women, the LGBTQ+ community, indigenous peoples, rural populations, and economically disadvantaged citizens. Political exclusion and systemic discrimination are common drivers of extremism, as they often lead to a sense of hopelessness or injustice that radical movements can exploit. Free and equal elections are a primary channel through which inclusion can be institutionalized - whether through proportional representation, accessible voting systems, political outreach, or, in some contexts, reserved seats for minority groups. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance notes that more than 30 countries have adopted minority quotas or reserved seats in their legislatures as a strategy for political inclusion. Examples include India (for different castes and tribes), New Zealand (Māori seats), and Colombia (Afro-Colombian and Indigenous representation). When marginalized communities see themselves reflected in political power structures and decision-making processes, the appeal of extremist ideologies tends to diminish. As highlighted by UNDP and USAID, inclusive governance offers peaceful pathways to address grievances, thereby reducing the likelihood that individuals turn to extremism.

To measure this dimension internationally, one of the most referenced databases is the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, which includes specific indicators under its Equal Protection Index and Political Equality Index. These sub-indices assess the extent to which individuals from different social groups enjoy equal political power and influence, as well as legal protections. V-Dem’s approach is grounded in a multidimensional view of democracy and relies on expert-coded assessments for consistency and global comparability. It provides disaggregated data on group inclusion, including access to civil liberties, representation in legislatures, and protections against discrimination. Additionally, the Gender Quota Database - maintained by International IDEA, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Stockholm University - offers insights into formal mechanisms like candidate quotas, which require political parties to nominate a minimum percentage of women on their electoral lists, and reserved seats, which guarantee a fixed number of legislative positions for women regardless of electoral outcomes. These mechanisms are widely used, and as of 2023, over 130 countries have adopted some form of gender quota.

According to V-Dem’s 2023 data, the United States ranks relatively high on formal inclusion metrics, such as universal suffrage and legal anti-discrimination protections. However, it lags behind many high-income democracies on effective inclusion and equitable political representation. For instance, the U.S. Political Equality Index (2023) score is 0.67 on a 0–1 scale, reflecting a moderate level of inclusion with significant room for improvement. While laws prohibit explicit discrimination in voting, systemic inequalities and structural barriers continue to limit genuine political participation for many groups.

While the United States may perform reasonably well on paper - thanks to constitutional guarantees, civil rights legislation, and anti-discrimination statutes - the practical enforcement of these protections often falls short. Legal frameworks alone are insufficient when the institutions responsible for upholding them are themselves implicated in perpetuating inequality. For instance, institutions such as law enforcement agencies and election officials - tasked with safeguarding equal access and civil rights - have historically engaged in practices that suppress minority political participation. While the most overt forms of disenfranchisement, like literacy tests and white-only primaries (which excluded Black voters from participating in primary elections), were outlawed during the civil rights era, more subtle tactics persist today. These include reducing the number of polling places in minority neighborhoods, imposing strict voter ID laws, and purging voter rolls - all of which disproportionately affect communities of color. Studies by the Brennan Center for Justice and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights have documented how such measures contribute to unequal access to the ballot. This disconnect between democratic ideals and uneven implementation fosters a credibility gap, undermining public trust in institutions that claim to uphold equal rights. It also highlights the importance of not only enacting inclusive policies but ensuring they are implemented equitably and without bias. In short, the presence of anti-racist laws does not guarantee an anti-racist system - especially when those tasked with applying the law operate within structures shaped by decades of racial inequality.

Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. - especially Black, Latino, and Indigenous communities - face enduring obstacles in political participation, including voter suppression tactics such as purging of voter rolls, gerrymandering of minority districts, strict voter ID laws, and limited polling access in minority neighborhoods. The 2013 Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act, has been widely criticized for weakening federal oversight of discriminatory practices at the state level.

According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, women’s representation in U.S. politics has grown but remains comparatively low. As of 2023, women hold around 29% of seats in Congress - below the global average for national parliaments and far behind countries with gender quotas or proportional systems. The situation is more dire for intersectional representation: Black, Latina, Asian, Indigenous, and LGBTQ+ women are significantly underrepresented in elected office, with women of color holding less than 10% of congressional seats (CAWP).

Despite increasing visibility, the LGBTQ+ community faces legislative backlash in many states, including restrictions on gender-affirming care and the inclusion of queer topics in education. These developments contribute to a political climate that discourages full civic participation and representation, even when formal legal rights exist.

The exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities from full political participation has far-reaching consequences for American politics. When these communities encounter systemic barriers - such as voter suppression, underrepresentation, and discriminatory districting - they often become disillusioned with traditional democratic processes. This erosion of trust contributes to lower voter turnout, weaker civic engagement, and a growing perception that political institutions do not serve their interests. In some cases, this marginalization has fueled support for outsider candidates or movements that promise radical change, disrupting conventional party coalitions and reshaping the political landscape. For instance, both left-wing and right-wing populist movements have capitalized on the grievances of underrepresented groups - either by mobilizing them with promises of justice and reform, or, conversely, by exploiting racial and cultural anxieties to suppress their influence or redirect blame. At the same time, many rural and lower-income white communities have been drawn to right-wing populist movements like the MAGA coalition, feeling abandoned by mainstream political elites and excluded from national economic and cultural narratives. In these cases, perceived exclusion - not only from material resources but from political recognition - has also driven radicalization. The resulting polarization further entrenches exclusion, creating a feedback loop that undermines democratic legitimacy. Addressing the political exclusion of minority communities is therefore not only a matter of equity but a crucial step in restoring faith in democratic governance and preventing the drift toward extremism.

Comparative Case Studies in Inclusion of Marginalized Groups

Germany performs considerably better on indicators of political inclusion. V-Dem ranks Germany at 0.85 on the Political Equality Index, citing strong anti-discrimination laws, inclusive political party structures, and high levels of gender and minority representation. Germany’s use of proportional representation encourages diversity among elected officials, and the federal government has adopted national strategies to promote the political participation of immigrants, disabled persons, and ethnic minorities (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2017). As of 2023, nearly 35% of Bundestag members are women, and the number of legislators with migrant backgrounds continues to grow. These efforts contribute to the perception that democratic institutions are open and representative - limiting the appeal of anti-systemic extremism.

Tunisia also presents a notable example of progress. Following its 2011 revolution, Tunisia implemented a vertical gender parity law requiring party lists to alternate between male and female candidates, resulting in one of the highest percentages of women in parliament in the Arab world (41% in the 2019 election). The Tunisian constitution also enshrines rights for people with disabilities and commits to combatting racial discrimination. However, challenges persist: political inclusion of Black Tunisians and the Amazigh community remains limited, and recent authoritarian backsliding threatens the gains of the post-revolutionary period. Nevertheless, Tunisia’s early reforms demonstrate how institutional change can foster participation and dampen extremist impulses by empowering long-excluded groups.

In contrast, Egypt and Turkey illustrate the risks of exclusionary governance. In Egypt, political power remains concentrated in the hands of military elites, and opposition parties, civil society organizations, and minority groups face severe repression. The Coptic Christian minority and other religious groups face restrictions in representation and expression. Women’s participation is limited by both legal hurdles and social norms, and LGBTQ+ individuals face criminalization and persecution. V-Dem ranks Egypt among the lowest globally on group equality and inclusion, scoring below 0.3 on the Political Equality Index.

Turkey exhibits similar trends. Although the country has held regular elections, President Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule has narrowed space for political dissent. The pro-Kurdish HDP (People’s Democratic Party) has been systematically targeted, with its leaders imprisoned and members expelled from parliament. Minority inclusion - especially for Kurds, Armenians, and LGBTQ+ communities - has declined sharply. Gender parity has also deteriorated, especially after Turkey’s 2021 withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on gender-based violence.

The United States can draw valuable lessons from both positive and negative examples. Like Germany and Tunisia, the U.S. could implement institutional reforms to improve representativeness and remove barriers to participation. Conversely, the U.S. must avoid the path taken by Egypt and Turkey, where exclusionary governance, repression of dissent, and erosion of civil liberties undermine political inclusion and fuel extremism. Ignoring or suppressing the voices of marginalized communities does not eliminate discontent - it redirects it into more radical channels, as numerous studies have shown that political exclusion and perceived injustice are key drivers of extremism and support for anti-establishment movements (UNDP, 2016; Schmid, 2013).

Ultimately, inclusion is not merely a moral imperative; it is a pragmatic strategy for democratic resilience. Ensuring that all citizens see themselves represented and respected in democratic institutions reduces the appeal of extremist ideologies and strengthens the social contract. A truly inclusive democracy is a more stable and peaceful one.

Freedom of Press and Civil Society

A free press and an active civil society are vital components of democratic ecosystems. They serve as watchdogs, forums for civic dialogue, and channels through which citizens can express dissent without resorting to violence. Independent media can expose corruption, highlight policy failures, and amplify marginalized voices, contributing to greater accountability and transparency in governance. Likewise, civil society organizations (CSOs) - such as Transparency International, which combats global corruption, or Legal Resources Centre in South Africa, which provides pro bono legal assistance to marginalized groups - can mobilize communities, monitor elections, and advocate for reforms. When these freedoms are protected, elections are more likely to be informed, participatory, and credible - thereby reducing the allure of extremist solutions. However, when governments suppress the press or restrict civil society, misinformation proliferates, grievances go unaddressed, and political polarization deepens. Extremist actors often flourish in such vacuums, filling the gap left by weakened democratic institutions. Thus, the health of press freedom and civil society directly influences whether elections foster democratic resilience or deepen political fragmentation and extremism.

To measure these dimensions internationally, the V-Dem project offers a robust and methodologically transparent assessment. Hosted by the University of Gothenburg and drawing on expert surveys from thousands of country specialists, V-Dem compiles indices that reflect the health of media freedom, civil society participation, and other democratic attributes. Two indices are especially relevant here: the “Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information” index and the “Civil Society Participation” index. These indicators assess not only formal rights, such as legal protections for journalists or NGOs, but also de facto conditions - including media independence, harassment levels, access to diverse viewpoints, and the ability of civil organizations to operate without state interference.

According to V-Dem data (2023), the United States presents a mixed picture. On the “Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources” index, the U.S. scored 0.77 on a scale from 0 (least free) to 1 (most free), indicating relatively strong legal protections but increasing concern over media polarization, economic pressures on journalism, and the rise of disinformation. The U.S. fared better in the “Civil Society Participation” index, scoring 0.85, reflecting the country’s long tradition of robust civic engagement and a high density of NGOs, community organizations, and advocacy movements. However, the V-Dem data also flag signs of deterioration over the past decade - particularly a rise in political polarization and state-level legal efforts to restrict protest rights and civil society activity. Early data from 2025 suggest these trends have accelerated under the current administration, with watchdog groups like CIVICUS and Freedom House noting increased constraints on media independence and civic organizing.

In terms of press freedom, the U.S. benefits from First Amendment protections, which prohibit censorship and protect journalists from legal reprisals. Nevertheless, these formal protections coexist with mounting challenges. Economic consolidation in media markets has diminished local journalism, while partisan outlets and algorithmic amplification on social media have deepened echo chambers and fueled disinformation. The phenomenon of “news deserts” - regions with little to no local reporting - further undermines informed civic participation. Additionally, the harassment of journalists - especially those covering protests or political scandals - has increased, with several high-profile arrests or attacks during demonstrations drawing concern from watchdog groups like Reporters Without Borders.

Civil society in the U.S. remains vibrant but unevenly empowered. Movements such as Black Lives Matter and March for Our Lives demonstrate the continued ability of grassroots activism to shape national debates. However, recent years have seen rising tensions between protestors and state authorities. Laws in states like Florida and Oklahoma have expanded penalties for participating in protests deemed “disruptive,” raising concerns about chilling effects on free assembly. Furthermore, political polarization has led to differential treatment of civil society groups, with some organizations labeled as “extremist” or “un-American” depending on the governing party. These dynamics suggest that while civil society remains a potent force, its capacity to serve as a democratic stabilizer is increasingly contested.

Comparative Case Studies of Freedom of Press and Civil Society

In contrast, Germany performs strongly on both V-Dem indices, scoring 0.87 for press freedom and 0.90 for civil society participation. German media is governed by stringent public broadcasting standards, diverse ownership, and clear regulations on political advertising and campaign coverage. The country's Press Council enforces ethical journalism, and constitutional protections for both media and CSOs are broadly respected. Importantly, Germany also enforces legislation such as the Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG) to curb hate speech and misinformation on social media platforms, without significantly undermining press independence. Civil society in Germany benefits from active government cooperation and funding, as well as a strong legal framework that protects NGOs, unions, and advocacy groups. These conditions enable citizens to voice dissent, debate policy, and participate meaningfully in democratic life - factors that have helped contain the appeal of extremist ideologies.

Tunisia, though facing significant democratic backsliding in recent years, had demonstrated important gains in this domain during the post-2011 transition period. From 2011 to around 2019, Tunisia’s V-Dem score for press freedom rose to 0.62 and civil society participation to 0.68 - remarkable improvements in a region often characterized by state control. Independent outlets flourished, and watchdog NGOs like Al Bawsala played a crucial role in monitoring government transparency. However, since President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power in 2021, these gains have been under threat. Critics note increased pressure on journalists and the use of military courts to try civilians, including civil society leaders. Still, Tunisia’s prior experience highlights the positive impact of empowering non-state actors to counterbalance political forces and channel public concerns away from violence.

By contrast, Egypt and Turkey illustrate how undermining press and civil society freedom can accelerate extremism and authoritarianism. Egypt scores just 0.19 in press freedom and 0.23 in civil society participation - among the lowest globally. Independent journalism is virtually nonexistent, with major outlets controlled by the state or allied business entities. NGOs operate under restrictive laws, and dozens of civil society activists remain imprisoned or harassed. In Turkey, President Erdoğan’s government has systematically eroded media independence, jailing journalists, shuttering opposition outlets, and using “insulting the president” laws to stifle dissent. Civil society, once a vibrant force in the early 2000s, has also been constricted through arrests, surveillance, and administrative burdens on NGOs. In both countries, the lack of legitimate outlets for dissent has driven opposition either into exile, into apathy, or into radical, sometimes militant, alternatives.

These comparisons yield clear insights for the United States. Germany and (to some extent) Tunisia demonstrate how robust protections for media and civil society contribute to democratic legitimacy and reduce the allure of extremist alternatives.

Strong civil organizations and independent journalism not only inform and engage citizens but also serve as pressure valves for discontent, channeling opposition into constructive forms. The U.S. can take inspiration from Germany’s effective media regulation and institutional support for civil society - without infringing on constitutional freedoms. Simultaneously, Egypt and Turkey highlight the dangers of undermining these freedoms: when citizens cannot trust information or organize peacefully, democratic channels collapse, and extremism can thrive.

To enhance its democratic resilience, the United States should invest in revitalizing local journalism, limiting excessive media consolidation by enforcing ownership caps and promoting diversity of outlets, and countering disinformation through public education and platform accountability. Protecting the rights of protestors and removing barriers to NGO operations - especially at the state level - are also critical. Ultimately, a well-informed and civically engaged public is the strongest antidote to political extremism, and that foundation rests on the twin pillars of press freedom and civil society.

Conclusion

The rise of political extremism in the United States cannot be understood in isolation from the structural features of its electoral system. Over the past decades, factors such as gerrymandering, closed primaries, the influence of dark money, and the decline of moderates have fundamentally distorted representation in Congress. These mechanisms reward ideological rigidity and punish compromise, producing a political environment where the loudest and most divisive voices dominate. As a result, legislative gridlock has become routine, and public faith in Congress - already at historic lows - continues to erode. What should be the arena for reasoned debate and problem-solving has instead become a stage for partisan conflict. The consequences are far-reaching: declining institutional trust, lower civic participation, and the normalization of affective polarization, where opposing political identities are perceived not merely as rivals but as existential enemies.

Yet, the same democratic mechanisms that enable dysfunction also hold the key to reversing it. The promise of equal and free elections lies in their potential to restore moderation and accountability - if their structural integrity can be safeguarded. Reforms such as independent redistricting commissions, ranked-choice voting, open primaries, and public campaign financing are not abstract ideals; they are concrete, evidence-based strategies that can reorient incentives toward coalition-building rather than extremism. States like Maine, Alaska, and California have already demonstrated that institutional design can meaningfully influence political behavior, producing candidates who must appeal to broader constituencies and engage in more civil discourse. However, electoral reform alone is insufficient. Without a cultural commitment to cooperation and truth - shared by the media, donors, and voters themselves - even the most technically sound elections will fail to heal the democratic divide. As Barber and McCarty (2016) argue, depolarization requires not only structural change but also civic renewal: a shift in values that prioritizes compromise, empathy, and trust over perpetual conflict.

The American experience thus illustrates a crucial paradox. The country possesses one of the world’s oldest democratic constitutions, yet many of its electoral practices - such as partisan redistricting and unrestricted private campaign finance - undermine the very equality and freedom those principles were meant to secure. Free and equal elections cannot exist in name only; they must operate within an ecosystem that ensures fairness, transparency, and inclusion. When citizens believe their votes matter equally, when institutions function impartially, and when civil discourse is grounded in truth, extremism loses its oxygen.

The ultimate measure in this comparative analysis is not merely whether countries hold elections, but whether those elections are meaningfully equal and free - and whether, as a result, they have succeeded in reducing political extremism. A truly equal and free election is not defined solely by the act of casting ballots; rather, it is one that is supported by four critical pillars: strong electoral integrity, robust institutional trust, meaningful inclusion of marginalized groups, and protections for press freedom and civil society. Only when these conditions are simultaneously met can elections provide the legitimacy, fairness, and representation necessary to channel public grievances into constructive democratic engagement, thereby quelling extremism and reinforcing social cohesion.

To better illustrate how these factors shape outcomes, the table below compares the five countries discussed above - Germany, Tunisia, the United States, Turkey, and Egypt - across the five key variables identified in this study.

As the table shows, Germany consistently performs at a high level across all factors. Its elections are clean, its institutions trusted, its political system inclusive, and its civic space vibrant. The result is a democratic culture where extremist movements - while not absent - are effectively kept in check. Germany’s PEI score of 81, high trust in government (61% per OECD), and V-Dem equality score of 0.85 reflect this democratic health.

Tunisia offers a more complex case. After the 2011 revolution, Tunisia made meaningful progress across several areas: it created an independent electoral commission, implemented a gender parity law, and saw an increase in civic participation. These reforms helped contain extremism by offering marginalized groups formal avenues for political expression. However, Tunisia’s recent democratic backsliding, particularly after President Kais Saied’s power consolidation in 2021, reminds us that democratic gains are not permanent. Even a promising foundation can erode without ongoing protection of democratic institutions, press freedom, and electoral independence. The U.S. must heed this warning - not only by establishing robust democratic safeguards but by ensuring they are continually enforced and protected against erosion.

In stark contrast, Turkey and Egypt illustrate what happens when elections are stripped of credibility. While elections are held regularly in both countries, they lack integrity, are conducted under authoritarian rule, and exclude large portions of the population from meaningful participation. Both rank among the lowest globally in press freedom and civil society participation. Unsurprisingly, extremism has not been curbed; rather, it has taken root either in opposition movements that feel silenced or in regimes that centralize power under the guise of stability.

Where Does the United States Stand?

The United States falls in the middle - more resilient than Turkey or Egypt, but trailing behind Germany and even Tunisia on several dimensions. It scores around 60 on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index, well below the average for long-standing democracies. Trust in institutions has reached historic lows, with only 8% of Americans expressing confidence in Congress and 26% in the presidency, according to Gallup’s 2023 data. The V-Dem Political Equality Index places the U.S. at 0.67, indicating moderate inclusion but persistent disparities. Press freedom remains formally protected under the First Amendment, but increasing polarization, media concentration, and the rise of misinformation have eroded its democratic function. Civil society remains vibrant, yet unevenly supported and increasingly politicized at the state level.

These metrics show that while the U.S. maintains the formal architecture of democracy - elections, courts, a free press, and representative institutions - the substantive quality of those elements is under strain. Events such as the January 6 Capitol attack, widespread belief in electoral fraud, and rising political violence are not symptoms of a system lacking elections; they are symptoms of a system where elections exist without the underlying conditions that make them credible and effective tools for democratic resolution.

Thus, the American experience supports a critical conclusion: Elections must be equal and free not just in name, but in all their functional dimensions. Without electoral integrity, people believe outcomes are rigged. Without institutional trust, they stop accepting the legitimacy of results. Without inclusion, they disengage - or worse, turn to radical alternatives. And without press freedom and civic engagement, misinformation spreads unchallenged and extremist narratives flourish. Only when all four pillars are strong can elections serve as a stabilizing force and reduce the allure of extremism.

To fulfill the promise of equal and free elections as a tool for countering extremism, the United States must take deliberate and sustained action across several interrelated dimensions. First, it is essential to reinforce electoral integrity by establishing uniform federal standards for ballot access, creating independent redistricting commissions to eliminate partisan gerrymandering, and enacting serious campaign finance reforms to reduce the influence of dark money and super PACs. Without these measures, the legitimacy of electoral outcomes remains vulnerable to public skepticism and manipulation by powerful interests.

Equally important is the need to rebuild institutional trust. This requires depoliticizing key institutions - particularly the judiciary and electoral authorities - ensuring transparency in governance, and investing in professional, nonpartisan public service. When citizens believe that institutions operate fairly and independently, they are more likely to accept election outcomes and engage constructively with the political system.

Expanding political inclusion is another critical pillar. The U.S. must work to protect and enhance voting rights, particularly through the restoration of key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. It should also support the representation of historically marginalized groups, including racial and ethnic minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals, and remove structural barriers that limit their access to candidacy and officeholding.

Furthermore, the protection and empowerment of civil society and independent journalism must be prioritized. This includes investing in local media to counter the growing number of news deserts, establishing transparency requirements to limit misinformation while respecting free speech, and safeguarding the right to protest and freely associate. A vibrant and independent civic sphere ensures that grievances can be expressed and addressed peacefully, preventing the kinds of vacuum that extremist movements seek to exploit.

In sum, equal and free elections are not guaranteed by the act of voting alone. They depend on a broader ecosystem of fairness, transparency, trust, and participation. Only by strengthening each of these pillars can elections fulfill their potential to reduce extremism and reinforce the long-term legitimacy of democratic governance.