Institutional Trust

Institutional trust is the public’s belief in the legitimacy, fairness, and effectiveness of core political institutions, such as the judiciary, legislature, electoral commissions, and law enforcement agencies. High levels of institutional trust often correlate with greater political participation, acceptance of electoral outcomes, and civic engagement - all of which are essential for democratic resilience. In contrast, low trust can create fertile ground for extremist ideologies to thrive, especially when institutions are perceived as corrupt, biased, or unresponsive to citizens’ needs. Free and equal  elections can serve as mechanisms to either restore or further erode institutional trust, depending on their transparency and inclusiveness. If electoral processes are handled credibly, they can reinforce the idea that institutions are capable of providing true representation and delivering justice. However, when institutions fail to manage elections effectively or equitably, they risk alienating the public and empowering anti-system actors. Thus, institutional trust acts as a crucial buffer or accelerant in the relationship between electoral democracy and political extremism. 

To measure institutional trust across countries in a rigorous and comparative way, the OECD’s Trust in Government Index and the Edelman Trust Barometer are two widely recognized, ideologically neutral data sources. The OECD index assesses trust in national governments across its member states through a combination of longitudinal survey data and expert analyses. Meanwhile, the Edelman Trust Barometer offers global survey-based insights on trust in four major institutional categories: government, business, media, and NGOs. While not perfect, both instruments have been extensively cited in academic and policy literature and offer valuable benchmarks for comparing public confidence in institutions across diverse political systems.

In the United States, institutional trust has been on a downward trajectory for several decades, reaching historic lows in recent years. According to Gallup’s 2023 Institutional Confidence Survey, only 26% of Americans expressed confidence in the presidency, 27% in the Supreme Court, and a mere 8% in Congress - the lowest among all institutions measured. These figures represent steep declines from prior decades. For instance, in the mid-1970s, shortly after the Watergate scandal, trust in the presidency hovered around 52%; it fell dramatically in the Trump and Biden eras due to widespread polarization, contested elections, and perceived executive overreach.

Trust in Congress has remained chronically low since the 2000s, reflecting public frustration with gridlock, partisanship, and the influence of special interest groups. With only 8% of Americans expressing confidence in the legislative branch we have reached an all-time low, which is significant because Congress is the body most closely tied to representative democracy - low trust here suggests a broader skepticism about democratic responsiveness and efficacy.

The judiciary, traditionally viewed as a stabilizing and impartial institution, has also seen a sharp decline in public trust. While the Supreme Court enjoyed majority confidence as recently as the early 2000s, its rating has dropped to 27% in 2023 following highly politicized decisions (e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturning Roe v. Wade), contentious confirmation processes, and increased perceptions of ideological bias. Lower courts fare somewhat better in public perception, but confidence remains uneven, often varying across geographic, socioeconomic, and partisan lines. For example, surveys suggest that residents of urban and more educated regions tend to express greater skepticism of judicial impartiality, while rural and lower-income populations are more likely to view local courts as trustworthy, particularly when aligned with their political preferences. A 2022 Pew Research Center study found that 68% of Democrats believe the Supreme Court is “too conservative,” while 60% of Republicans see it as “balanced” or “not conservative enough,” underscoring how trust in institutions is increasingly filtered through partisan lenses.

At the state and local levels, trust varies widely. Local governments, particularly municipal agencies like public schools or city councils, tend to enjoy relatively higher confidence - Gallup reported about 66% of Americans trusting local governments to handle problems effectively in 2022. However, this too is uneven, with trust generally lower in urban centers grappling with issues like police misconduct or budget crises.

Among law enforcement and national security institutions, trust remains higher but still shows signs of erosion. For example, confidence in the military remains one of the highest across institutions, around 60%, yet even this has declined from peaks of over 75% in the early 2000s. Trust in federal agencies such as the FBI, however, is now heavily polarized. Historically, moderate voters and Democrats have maintained trust in the agency, while increasingly large segments of the Republican base view it as politically weaponized. It’s important to note that most comprehensive trust surveys predate Donald Trump’s 2025 inauguration. However, a recent AP–NORC poll from early 2025 found that only about 2 in 10 U.S. adults say they have high confidence in the FBI and the Justice Department acting fairly under Trump’s administration. This suggests that concerns about partisan use of federal agencies not only persisted but may have intensified.

Importantly, these varying levels of institutional trust have become strongly correlated with political identity. A 2022 report by the American National Election Studies (ANES) found that Republican trust in government dropped to just 13% following the 2020 election (when Joe Biden (D) won the presidential race) compared to 45% among Democrats. This was a complete reversal from the 2016 election, when Democrats’ trust was low and Republican trust was comparatively high (when Donald Trump (R) was elected). This oscillation indicates an unstable foundation of trust in institutions and conditional trust based on partisan control. Such volatility makes democratic institutions vulnerable to manipulation, delegitimization, and anti-system narratives, especially during electoral transitions or periods of political scandal.

Furthermore, institutional trust is highly stratified along racial, socioeconomic, and generational lines. Black and Latino Americans, for example, have historically exhibited lower trust in law enforcement and the justice system due to systemic discrimination, over-policing, and inequities in legal outcomes (Pew Research Center, 2022; Pew Research Center, 2024). At the same time, younger Americans (ages 18–29) report the lowest trust in government of any age group, according to Pew (2023), citing climate inaction, student debt, and lack of representation as key grievances.

Comparative Case Studies in Institutional Trust

Germany demonstrates considerably higher levels of institutional trust. The OECD 2023 report ranks trust in the German government at 61%, significantly above the U.S. average. Germany’s political institutions benefit from a strong federal system with checks and balances, professional civil service, and a Constitutional Court widely perceived as impartial. Transparent policymaking and consistent rule enforcement have helped preserve public confidence, even amid political disagreements. Importantly, Germany has actively addressed past authoritarian legacies through civic education, institutional reforms, and a commitment to democratic accountability. These efforts have strengthened the legitimacy of the system and reduced the appeal of anti-system extremism.

Tunisia, while not without challenges, offers another instructive case. In the years following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia launched a national transitional justice process - including the Truth and Dignity Commission (established 2013–14) - and pushed forward significant civic participation initiatives like public consultations in constitutional drafting and the decentralization of political power to local municipalities. These efforts aimed to rebuild institutional trust by addressing past abuses, engaging citizens directly in governance, and distributing authority beyond the central state. Trust in the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) has remained relatively high compared to other government bodies, being considered a credible arbiter of democratic competition. While overall trust in Tunisian institutions remains mixed - hovering around 40–45% depending on the institution and survey year - this is still notable in the regional context, where trust in state institutions is typically much lower. The presence of relatively trusted electoral and judicial institutions has helped provide a democratic outlet for dissent, mitigating the risk of radicalization.

In contrast, Egypt and Turkey exhibit low levels of institutional trust, which correlates with the persistence of authoritarianism and heightened political extremism. In Egypt, the government under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has systematically repressed civil society, restricted media freedom, and undermined judicial independence. According to Arab Barometer (2022) data, trust in Egypt’s parliament is below 20%, and confidence in the judiciary is also low, undermined by perceptions of politicization and lack of accountability. Similarly, in Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, trust in government and judiciary institutions has plummeted due to widespread purges, media crackdowns, and the centralization of power. The World Values Survey reports that Turkish citizens' trust in parliament and political parties has declined sharply in recent years, with growing segments of the population viewing the political system as unresponsive or corrupt.

The experiences of Germany and Tunisia offer valuable lessons for the United States on how to rebuild and sustain institutional trust. Both cases demonstrate that trust can be cultivated through transparency, fairness, and efforts to include citizens in democratic decision-making. Germany’s investment in civic education, independent judiciary, and professional public administration (referring to merit-based, well-resourced, and politically neutral state institutions) serves as a model for restoring credibility. While the U.S. also has a large network of state and federal agencies, trust in these institutions has declined due to factors such as politicization, inconsistent service delivery, and perceptions of bureaucratic inefficiency. Tunisia, despite economic and political instability, shows that even fragile democracies can strengthen trust when institutions function with relative independence and openness. The U.S. could benefit from reinforcing institutional neutrality - particularly in law enforcement and judicial appointments - alongside empowering watchdog bodies and ethics enforcement mechanisms to expose and penalize misconduct, ensuring that powerful actors cannot operate above the law or manipulate democratic institutions unchecked.

Conversely, Egypt and Turkey serve as cautionary tales. In both cases, institutional decay and repression of dissent have created vacuums filled by extremism, conspiracy theories, and political violence. For the United States, continued erosion of governmental trust - especially when fueled by disinformation and political attacks on oversight institutions - risks similar destabilizing effects. Avoiding this path requires defending institutional autonomy, depoliticizing electoral and judicial bodies, and fostering public engagement through meaningful civic education and transparency.