Introduction

In recent years, American politics has become increasingly defined by political extremism, where ideological divisions run deep, and cooperation across party lines seems more elusive than ever. Polarization in the U.S. has reached levels not seen in decades - according to a 2020 Pew Research Center study, 77% of Americans say that the country is more divided than in the past. This growing gulf between the two major parties has resulted in legislative gridlock. 

This paper will explore the roots of political polarization, including historical, cultural, and institutional factors, and argue that the current electoral system plays a central role in fostering extreme partisanship. By examining how polarization manifests in Congress and how electoral reforms can counteract these structural drivers, this paper will show that free  and equal elections are not only a moral imperative but a practical solution to reducing extremism. Ultimately, by addressing the flaws in our electoral system, we can create a political environment that encourages moderation and cooperative governance - values that benefit all Americans, regardless of party affiliation. 

To better understand the conditions under which elections can either reduce or exacerbate extremism, this paper includes four international case studies - two in which democratic elections were linked to a decline in extremism, and two where elections either failed to prevent or actively contributed to its rise. They are compared under four pillars - electoral integrity, institutional trust, inclusion of marginalized groups, and freedom of press and civil society. The goal of this section is to analyse the relationship between extremism and elections abroad in order to draw lessons and conclusions for the United States.

The Congress

The United States Congress is a bicameral legislature composed of two chambers: the House of Representatives and the Senate. The house has 435 members with representation based on the size of the population in each state, while the senate has 100 members consisting of two senators per state regardless of its size. This dual-chamber system was a compromise to balance the interests of populous and smaller states, ensuring that neither could dominate the legislative process (U.S. Constitution, Article I). Members of the House serve two-year terms and are elected by voters in geographically defined congressional districts, designed to promote responsiveness to public opinion and frequent accountability. Senators serve six-year staggered terms, with approximately one-third elected every two years through statewide popular vote, following the Seventeenth Amendment’s establishment of direct senatorial elections (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 3; Seventeenth Amendment, 1913). Together, both chambers are responsible for creating, debating, and passing laws that govern critical areas such as healthcare, education, taxation, infrastructure, national defense, and civil rights. For a bill to become a law, it must pass both the House and Senate in identical form before being presented to the President for signature or veto, a process that was intended to encourage thorough deliberation and compromise. (Barber & McCarty, 2016). Additionally, the Senate holds unique powers, including confirming presidential appointments and ratifying treaties, serving as an essential check on executive authority. The House of Representatives also holds distinct responsibilities, such as initiating revenue bills and having the sole power to impeach federal officials, reinforcing its role as the chamber most directly accountable to the electorate. Congress’s legislative decisions profoundly impact nearly every facet of American life, making effective and representative governance vital to the nation’s well-being and democratic accountability.

Extremism in American Politics

However, Congress today is more divided and less productive than ever before. Increasing polarization has pushed members of both parties to opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, making bipartisan cooperation rare. As a result, Congress frequently faces legislative gridlock, where critical bills struggle to pass despite urgent public need. According to Jacobson (2013), the sharp partisan divide has led to frequent party-line voting, reducing the opportunity for compromise and moderate policymaking. The Pew Research Center (2024) highlights that a growing majority of Americans perceive Congress as ineffective, with approval ratings often dipping below 20%. This dysfunction has serious consequences: essential issues like healthcare reform, infrastructure investment, and climate policy stall, eroding public trust in the legislative branch. The persistent stalemate also discourages moderate candidates and voters, further fueling a cycle of extremism and legislative paralysis. Ultimately, this division threatens the core democratic purpose of Congress - to represent diverse viewpoints and enact laws that serve the national interest. 

This pervasive legislative gridlock and the broader surge in political extremism are not random occurrences but rather the product of several interconnected and evolving factors within the American political system, its media landscape, and its broader culture. These shifts have collectively pushed the political discourse towards its ideological fringes, making moderation and bipartisan cooperation increasingly rare. A primary cause stems from a fundamental shift within the political parties themselves. Since the 1970s, there has been a noticeable loss of moderates among both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, transforming the ideological composition of the legislative body. For instance, the political center in Congress has shrunk markedly, with Brookings Institution noting it has fallen to about 10 percent of House and Senate members today, down from around 30 percent in the 1960s and 1970s. 

This ideological sorting means fewer lawmakers possess the flexibility, incentive, or latitude to bridge partisan divides, leading to reduced overlap in policy preferences and a pervasive "us vs. them" mentality (Jacobson, 2013; Fleisher & Bond, 2004; Campbell, 2016). Concurrently, a phenomenon where moderates drop out of political participation has further empowered the extremes. As voters in the political middle become less engaged - perhaps due to disillusionment with gridlock or a perception of being unrepresented - the more staunchly partisan segments of the electorate gain outsized influence, particularly in low-turnout primary elections. This dynamic ensures that candidates who cater to fervent or fringe bases, rather than the broader, more moderate center, are more likely to succeed and advance to general elections (Abramowitz, 2010, "The Disappearing Center"). 

Beyond internal party dynamics, the modern media environment and the proliferation of misinformation have played a critical, perhaps even catalytic, role in exacerbating extremism. The rise of social media and misinformation has fractured the public into disparate and often insulated information ecosystems, where individuals increasingly inhabit distinct information bubbles and rarely agree on foundational facts, let alone interpretations of events. This technological shift enables the rapid dissemination of highly partisan or outright false narratives. Yerlikaya and Aslan (2020) highlighted how the viral spread of fake news, in particular, actively deepens these ideological divides and solidifies partisan worldviews.This phenomenon is powerfully compounded by pervasive confirmation bias online, where algorithmic feeds and individual consumption habits curate content, ensuring people predominantly encounter information that reinforces their existing beliefs and biases. For example, research on Facebook users revealed that for the median user, slightly over half of the content they saw was from politically like-minded sources, severely limiting exposure to diverse viewpoints (Syracuse University, 2023). As documented by Sunstein (2001), this leads to a "cyber-cascades" effect, where individuals are exposed to an ever-narrowing stream of reinforcing information, making it challenging to engage with opposing viewpoints or even acknowledge a shared objective reality. The impact is profound: a Pew Research study cited by YIP Institute found that 73% of Democrats and Republicans cannot even agree on basic facts. This epistemic polarization is further fueled by declining trust in traditional media. Gallup's 2024 data reveals only 31% of Americans express a "great deal" or "fair amount" of confidence in the mass media, with a stark partisan divide between 59% of Republicans who have "no trust at all" compared to just 6% of Democrats (Gallup, 2024).

Finally, the escalation of culture wars and tribalism has entrenched ideological polarization at a deeply personal and identity-based level. Republicans and Democrats are not only increasingly polarized over economic or governmental policies, but more importantly they are increasingly polarized by how their political affiliations have fused with their fundamental social and cultural identities. James E Campbell, in his 2016 book Polarized: Making sense of a divided America, elucidates this phenomenon, arguing that these identity-based and cultural divides now outweigh traditional economic cleavages in shaping political identities and loyalties. The author reveals that partisan identity has effectively transformed into a powerful social identity, where an individual’s sense of belonging and even self-worth has become intrinsically linked to their party. This “bottom-up” polarization, driven by the public rather than just elites, as Campbell identifies, intensifies group solidarity while simultaneously fueling a potent “affective polarization” - a deep-seated animosity and distrust towards the opposing side. The Pew Research Center’s 2022 report “As partisan hostility grows, signs of frustrations with the two party systems” underscores this, revealing that from 2016 to 2022, a growing share of each party described the other as closed-minded, dishonest, immoral, and unintelligent.  Consequently, the very notion of compromise is reframed; it is no longer a pragmatic policy adjustment but an agonizing perceived betrayal of core values and group allegiance. This profound intertwining of political and personal identity creates significant barriers to consensus, solidifying divisions that manifest not only as policy disagreements, but as fundamental clashes of identity and worldview.

Extremism in Congress

Beyond the shifts in party composition, the fragmented media landscape and the hardening of identity-based loyalties, the very institutional structure and long-standing norms of Congress have also undergone transformational changes over the last decades, further exacerbating polarization. Historically, Congress operated with a greater emphasis on compromise, robust committee work, and regular social interaction across the aisle, fostering an environment where cooperation across ideological differences was a functional norm. However this operational ethos began to erode under new leadership styles. For instance, the Republican Revolution of the 1990’s, particularly under the assertive leadership of Newt Gingrich, ushered in a more confrontational approach. David W Rohde and Stuart Theriault (2017), in Party Polarization in Congress, argue that this period saw a critical shift where party leaders gained more power, which they then used to enforce greater party discipline and strategically structure legislative procedures to highlight partisan differences. Their research provides empirical evidence that a significant portion of the rise in party polarization has occurred via the increasing frequency of procedural votes. These procedural votes, often on motions to table, suspend rules, or limit debate, became flashpoints, demonstrating leaders’ increased ability to ensure party-line voting and block opposition initiatives. Rohde and Theriault highlight how such votes, previously less ideologically charged, became key indicators of partisan division, revealing how members ceded more control to leaders committed to advancing a unified party agenda. 

Gary C Jacobson’s 2013 book, Party Polarization in American Politics, emphasizes how this era was marked by the increasing nationalization of elections, transforming congressional contests into referendums on national party leaders and platforms rather than prioritizing local issues. Jacobson demonstrates, for instance, how this nationalization led to a sharp decline in split ticket voting and a corresponding rise in straight-party voting, indicating that voters’ choices for Congress became increasingly tied to their national partisan identity rather than incumbent performance. He further argues that the strategic demonization of the opposition became a more prevalent political tactic, contributing to a legislative environment where bipartisanship was actively discouraged and seen as weakness, as parties sought to define themselves in stark contrast to their opponents in order to mobilize their bases. This profound institutional breakdown, characterized by stronger, more assertive party leadership and often hostile political discourse, has since manifested as a sharp decline in cross-party cooperation, contributing significantly to legislative paralysis and eroding public confidence in the government’s capacity to address pressing issues. 

Within the United States Congress, extremism shapes the legislative body’s character and operational dynamics. This phenomenon is tied to the evolving ideological composition of its members, coupled with observable shifts in voting patterns and representational trends. One primary facet of this extremism is the increasing ideological intensity of its members, driven by two key factors. The first factor comes from Sean Thierault’s 2006 research,  which sheds light on the increasing ideological divide beginning in the 1970’s within the United States Congress, particularly through the concept of the Replacement Effect. The author demonstrates that member replacement is a crucial factor of the total polarization observed in the US House and Senate. This phenomenon largely stems from the substitution of more moderate southern Democrats with increasingly conservative Republicans. As moderate voices retire or are defeated, they were replaced with more rigid ideological stances, effectively pushing the Congressional ideological center further apart. The research also highlights a decline in the number of moderates, noting that while moderates constituted 60% of Congress in 1968, this figure plummeted to just 25% in 2005. The second factor that Theriault identifies is “member adaptation,” where legislators become more ideologically extreme after being elected to Congress. Instead of new members pushing ideological boundaries, existing members who may have started as moderate become more extreme in their respective parties as they gain seniority, either as a response to electoral changes, party pressure, ideological reinforcement, and/or the desire to avoid primary challenges from more extreme candidates in their own party. However, Theriault reaffirms that although this accounts for more than a third of party polarization, it is still less impactful than the two-thirds attributed to the Replacement Effect. 

The impact of this ideological shift is vividly reflected in congressional voting patterns and the overall composition of the legislature. According to Jacobson (2013), party-line votes have become the norm, with most significant legislation passing or failing strictly along partisan divides. This trend is quantitatively illustrated by DW-NOMINATE scores, a widely used measure developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, which consistently show a widening ideological gap between the two major parties. For instance, the ideological distance between the median House Democrat and median House Republican, as measured by DW-NOMINATE scores, has dramatically increased from around 0.40 in the mid-1970s to over 1.00 by the 2010s, representing a stark ideological separation (https://www.google.com/search?q=Voteview.com, updated data). This data confirms the systematic disappearance of centrists in Congress. Political scientists like Abramowitz (2010) and Fleisher and Bond (2004) have extensively documented this, noting that the percentage of "moderate" members (those whose DW-NOMINATE scores fall within a specific central range) has plummeted from over 40% in the 1970s to less than 10% in recent Congresses (https://www.google.com/search?q=Voteview.com; Abramowitz, 2010). These studies reveal a legislative landscape where the middle ground has largely evaporated, leaving a stark dichotomy between the liberal and conservative poles.

Furthermore, a distinction in polarization often exists between the two chambers. The House of Representatives tends to be more polarized than the Senate (McCarty, 2011; Fleisher & Bond, 2004). For example, in the 117th Congress (2021-2023), the average DW-NOMINATE score for ideological separation between the parties was typically higher in the House than in the Senate (https://www.google.com/search?q=Voteview.com data). This can be attributed to several factors, including the smaller, more homogenous districts represented by House members, which often allow for the election of more ideologically extreme candidates who cater to a specific partisan base. Higher turnover rates in the House also contribute to this effect; for instance, over 100 new members joined the House in both the 2010 and 2018 elections, significantly more than typically seen in the Senate, leading to new members often being more ideologically distinct than their predecessors and reinforcing the replacement effect (Congressional Research Service, 2023). The Senate, with its statewide constituencies and longer terms, theoretically encourages a broader appeal and more bipartisan compromise, though it too has experienced significant polarization.

Equal and Free Elections in the Face of Extremism

The question then arises: can free and fair elections serve as a mechanism to reduce this entrenched political extremism? While the concept of democratic elections is foundational to representative governance, several aspects of the current electoral system in the United States are demonstrably broken and, arguably, contribute to the very extremism they should mitigate.

A significant structural issue is gerrymandering, where politicians manipulate electoral district boundaries to favor their own party, creating "safe seats" with little to no genuine competition (Kamarck & Galston, 2013). Research by the Brennan Center for Justice (2021) indicated that in the 2020 election cycle, an estimated 88% of House districts were uncompetitive, meaning the winning candidate secured their seat by a margin of 10 percentage points or more. FairVote (2024) further highlights that in the 2022 midterm elections, only 32 of 435 House races (about 7.4%) were decided by a margin of less than 5 percentage points, reinforcing the prevalence of safe districts. These districts are designed to ensure one party's victory, regardless of broader shifts in public opinion, effectively removing the incentive for elected officials to appeal to moderate voters or engage in bipartisan compromise. When a legislator's primary concern is fending off a challenge from their party's ideological extreme in a low-turnout primary, rather than winning over general election voters, their behavior in Congress naturally shifts towards more partisan positions.

Another contributing factor is the prevalence of closed primaries. In these elections, only registered members of a political party can vote, meaning candidates must cater to the most ideologically fervent segment of their base to secure the nomination (Abramowitz, 2010). As of 2024, 15 states operate entirely closed primary systems, and an additional 10 states have semi-closed primaries, limiting independent voter participation (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2024). This system effectively pushes candidates further to the extremes, as moderate positions are unlikely to win over the core partisan voters who decide primary contests. For example, primary election turnout is often significantly lower than general election turnout; in the 2022 midterm elections, primary turnout averaged around 20-30% of eligible voters in many states, compared to over 50% for the general election (U.S. Elections Project, 2022). This allows a smaller, more ideologically committed slice of the electorate to disproportionately influence candidate selection. The Bipartisan Policy Center (2024) notes that "primary voters tend to be more partisan and ideologically extreme than the general electorate," further indicating how this system can lead to more polarized nominees. By the time the general election arrives, voters are often left with a choice between two highly polarized candidates, neither of whom may represent the political center.

Finally, the influence of big money in politics exacerbates extremism. The influx of "dark money" from undisclosed donors and the rise of Super PACs following decisions like Citizens United v. FEC (2010) allow wealthy individuals and special interest groups to funnel vast sums into campaigns, often funding highly divisive candidates and attack ads (McCarty, 2011). According to OpenSecrets.org (2024), total spending in federal elections has skyrocketed, with over $16.7 billion spent in the 2022 election cycle, a significant portion of which came from outside spending groups. "Dark money" spending by politically active non-profits (501(c)(4)s) reached over $1.2 billion in 2020, with the vast majority of these funds supporting or opposing specific candidates without disclosing their donors (OpenSecrets.org, 2021). This financial leverage incentivizes candidates to adopt extreme positions that appeal to their benefactors, further marginalizing more moderate voices and making it difficult for grassroots candidates to compete without significant financial backing.

Despite these systemic impediments, several electoral reforms have been proposed, and in some cases implemented, with the aim of mitigating extremism and fostering greater moderation and cooperation.

One promising reform is the implementation of independent redistricting commissions. By taking the power to draw electoral maps away from partisan politicians and entrusting it to non-partisan bodies, these commissions can create fairer, more competitive districts that reflect geographic and demographic realities rather than political self-interest (Kamarck & Galston, 2013). As of 2024, eight states utilize independent commissions for congressional redistricting, with several others using advisory or hybrid commissions (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2024). A study by the Brennan Center for Justice (2022) found that states with independent commissions consistently produce maps with significantly less partisan bias compared to those drawn by state legislatures. For instance, in states like California and Arizona, which use independent commissions, congressional districts tend to be more competitive, as measured by typical partisan vote margins, fostering an environment where candidates must appeal to a broader electorate (FairVote, 2024).

Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) is another reform gaining traction. In RCV, voters rank candidates in order of preference rather than choosing just one. If no candidate receives a majority of first-place votes, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and their votes are reallocated to the voters' next choice. This process continues until one candidate achieves a majority. RCV discourages negative campaigning and incentivizes candidates to build broader coalitions by appealing to voters beyond their base, as securing second or third-place rankings can be crucial for victory (FairVote.org). Its successful implementation in states like Maine (for federal elections since 2018) and Alaska (since 2022) demonstrates its potential to elect more moderate candidates and promote less divisive politics. In Maine's 2022 2nd Congressional District election, for example, RCV ensured the winning candidate achieved a majority, and analysis suggested it led to less negative campaigning compared to traditional elections (FairVote, 2023).

The adoption of open primaries (or non-partisan primaries) would also help broaden the base of voters in initial nominating contests, allowing independents and even members of other parties to participate (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2024). Currently, 19 states utilize fully open primary systems, while 16 states have semi-open primaries, permitting some non-affiliated voter participation (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2024). The Bipartisan Policy Center (2024) argues that allowing the growing number of independent voters (which comprise over 40% of the electorate in some states like Colorado, according to Pew Research Center data) to participate in primaries could significantly dilute the influence of highly partisan factions and encourage candidates to adopt more inclusive platforms.

Finally, public campaign financing schemes aim to reduce the influence of wealthy donors and Super PACs by providing candidates with public funds to run their campaigns. This reform would enable grassroots candidates to compete effectively without relying on large contributions from special interests, thereby encouraging greater responsiveness to the general public rather than a narrow set of donors (McCarty, 2011). States like Arizona and Maine, and cities such as New York City and Seattle, have implemented various forms of public financing programs. The Brennan Center for Justice (2023) has shown that New York City's public financing system has significantly increased the diversity of candidates, with candidates of color winning 64% of publicly financed city council races compared to 36% without public funds, and has reduced the reliance on large individual donors. For instance, under NYC's program, small-dollar donors (giving $175 or less) accounted for nearly 60% of contributions to participating candidates in recent elections, demonstrating a shift towards broader citizen engagement (Brennan Center, 2023).

Complementing these established reforms, initiatives similar to what the non-profit Wilson's Fountain is proposing offer a unique, systemic approach to leverage free and equal elections against extremism. Drawing inspiration from Constitutional author James Wilson's assertion that truly "free and equal elections" are the "original fountain" of democracy, this non-profit aims to fundamentally reform the relationship between politicians and money (Wilson's Fountain, 2025). Their strategy directly addresses the "poisoning" of this fountain, particularly through gerrymandering and the pervasive influence of campaign finance. Wilson's Fountain envisions a new model of political party, not based on ideology, but on operating a truly free and equal nominating system. This system would use local committees to customize nomination processes for districts and manage uncoordinated general election campaigns for nominees via a Super PAC. By dramatically increasing constituent participation through an online, free, and equal nominating system, they believe they can elevate candidates who are genuinely motivated to serve local interests and broadly represent their constituents (Wilson's Fountain, 2025). This approach seeks to restore the voice of the people and dampen the power of money, which they identify as a primary driver of the current toxic dysfunction and extremism.

However, it is crucial to acknowledge the limits of reforms. While changes to election systems are vital, rules alone are not a panacea for the deep-seated cultural and ideological divisions that fuel political extremism (Campbell, 2016; McCarty, 2011). Simply altering voting mechanisms will not instantly repair a fractured political culture that has become accustomed to animosity and distrust. For instance, despite California's independent redistricting commission and top-two primary (a form of non-partisan primary), the state's congressional delegation still reflects significant partisan alignment, indicating that broader cultural and national political forces remain powerful.

Ultimately, a sustained effort to reduce extremism requires more than just structural adjustments to elections. There is a fundamental need to reward cooperation—a responsibility that falls not only on political leaders but also on the media, financial donors, and, most importantly, the voters themselves. As Barber and McCarty (2016) suggest, if media outlets continue to amplify divisive rhetoric, if donors continue to fund ideologically rigid candidates, and if voters continue to reward confrontational behavior, even the most well-intentioned electoral reforms will struggle to stem the tide of polarization. For free and fair elections to truly foster moderation, society must collectively shift its values to prioritize compromise, civility, and a shared commitment to functional governance over ideological purity and partisan victory. Only then can the promise of representative democracy be fully realized, moving beyond the current era of legislative gridlock and entrenched extremism.

Research has shown that when elections are influenced by gerrymandering, money, and closed primaries, political leaders are incentivized to cater to their most extreme bases rather than the broader electorate. For instance, in the post-1970s era, the number of moderate Republicans in the House dropped from 87 to just 11 by 1990, while moderate Democrats went from 109 to 52. This erosion of the political center was further amplified by the rise of social media, which a 2020 study from Yerlikaya and Aslan attributed as a major factor in fueling misinformation and deepening partisan worldviews, particularly among younger voters. 

With Congress averaging only 56% of proposed legislation passed in recent years, the lowest success rate since the 1940s. More concerning, however, is the fact that this extremism is not a natural outcome of shifting political views, but rather a product of structural flaws in the electoral system. A 2021 study found that gerrymandering alone has created "safe" districts for incumbents, leading to a situation where fewer than 5% of U.S. House races are considered competitive.

Comparative Analysis 

While equal and free elections are often seen as the cornerstone of democratic governance, their ability to quell political extremism depends heavily on the broader institutional and societal context in which they occur. Elections alone do not guarantee democratic resilience; rather, it is the quality, credibility, and inclusiveness of electoral processes that determine whether they channel dissent into constructive political engagement or, conversely, fuel radicalization. To assess this dynamic more systematically, this comparative analysis examines four critical dimensions that shape the relationship between electoral democracy and extremism: electoral integrity, institutional trust, inclusion of marginalized groups, and freedom of press and civil society.

This section applies these five criteria to a selection of case studies - Germany and Tunisia, which have shown relative success in reducing extremist threats through democratic means, and Turkey and Egypt, where democratic backsliding and institutional repression have coincided with persistent or growing extremism. The United States, the focal point of this study, is situated between these models: formally democratic but showing signs of institutional strain, polarization, and democratic erosion.

Through this comparative lens, the analysis aims to uncover not only how different political systems have performed across these five variables, but also what lessons the United States can draw from their successes and failures. By doing so, it offers a more nuanced understanding of when and how elections fulfill their democratic promise - and when they fall short.